Political analysts are calling 1992 a watershed year in foreign relations for the ROC on Taiwan, and with good reason. In early December 1992, U.S. Trade Representative Carla Hills arrived in Taipei, the first U.S. cabinet-level official to visit the ROC since such contact was banned thirteen years ago. The month before, German Vice Chancellor and Economics Minister Juergen Moellemann broke a similar ban on official contacts when he arrived in Taipei to promote Sino-German technical cooperation. Last September, the United States agreed to sell 150 F-16 A/B fighter planes to the ROC, ending a decade-long ban on advanced weapons sales. Three months later France agreed to sell 60 Mirage 2000-5 fighters. And these are just the highlights in one of the busiest years in the diplomatic history of the ROC.
Such breakthroughs were unthinkable a year or two ago. For more than a decade, the ROC was a political nonentity in the community of nations, despite being one of the world's top trading nations. What is the reason for ROC's recent success? Partial credit for this striking turn-around in international affairs must be given to the ROC's new brand of diplomacy. Termed "pragmatic" diplomacy, its main underlying principle is simple: take a hard-nosed account of realities, then do what works.
The Republic of China was frozen out of international circles during the Cold War. In the 1960s, as mainland China became more important to the world community as a counterbalance to Soviet power, countries began shifting diplomatic relations away from the ROC. Perhaps the biggest setback came in 1972, when the ROC lost its seat in the United Nations. After that, Taipei's position in the world continued to deteriorate. The trend gained momentum after the United States recognized Peking in 1979. As a result, the 1980s was a particularly glum period for ROC diplomats.
Jui-hsiung Ouyang "We must be flexible in promoting our foreign relations."
The situation was aggravated by a hard-line one-China policy. For decades Taipei and Peking insisted on pushing that policy to the extremes in the international arena. If Taipei established diplomatic relations with a particular country, Peking would break ties; if Peking established ties with a nation, Taipei would sever its diplomatic links. Over the last twenty years, this so-called "zero-sum" game between the two sides of the Taiwan Straits caused the ROC to lose ground steadily in the diplomatic community. By the mid-1980s, the ROC had relations with just over twenty nations. The policy, which severely limited the ROC's substantive participation in international affairs, was based on principle, pride, and a conviction that the mainland communist regime would necessarily collapse.
Attempts to build the ROC's image overseas were also hampered by the continued existence of martial law at home. This often put diplomats in embarrassing circumstances when forced to explain ROC policy. Then on July 15. 1987, after thirty-eight years, martial law was finally lifted. The rescission of the Emergency Decree, which activated martial law, ushered in an era of broad and sweeping reforms. Social, political, and economic change came at a dizzying speed. For example, what seemed in 1987 to be little more than routine political exhortations—calls for widespread political democratization and economic internationalization—have in fact come true in a period of five years.
Look at the economic achievements. Beginning in the early 1980s, the ROC experienced double-digit economic growth. By 1991, total foreign trade reached US$139 billion, making it the world's fourteenth largest trading nation. The same year, foreign exchange reserves reached US$90 billion, the highest in the world, and per capita GNP reached US$8,700. Equally impressive was the government's determination to proceed with political reforms. Martial law was lifted, and the senior parliamentarians who had served forty years in office without facing elections were retired by the end of 1991. And full legislative elections were held late last year.
Daniel Chieh -"You may not know who I am, but my country should be recognized."
Despite the rapid growth in economic and trade links around the globe, the ROC's international standing failed to make similar gains. As increasing numbers of people went abroad for business and tourism, they frequently encountered visa and other document problems. ROC nationals often found themselves standing in front of a stern-faced immigration official trying to explain where they were from. Daniel Chieh (解崙 ), of BSL Instrumentation, says: "I travel a lot on business. I've got 378 entry and exit stamps on my passport. But my experience with people from other countries is that they never know clearly where I come from. From my face, they think I'm from Japan. And when I tell them that I'm from Taiwan, they get confused and think I'm from Thailand. You may not know who I am, but my country should be recognized."
After returning from abroad, many tourists and business people complained that their country did not receive appropriate attention and respect from the international community. In the past, there had been no public debate on the nation's foreign policy. But the decline of diplomatic presence eventually led to a widespread demands for a major re-examination of the situation. A ground swell of public opinion grew, augmented by an almost cocky self-confidence that evolved with the growth of the ROC's economic strength and political freedoms. Thus, public consensus on the issue helped produce an environment where a more flexible approach to international affairs became possible.
A major turning point came in January 1988 when Lee Teng-hui was sworn in as president. After evaluating the international situation and the growing domestic sentiment for constructive change, the president began publicly promoting what he termed a more pragmatic diplomacy. This signaled a clear shift in foreign policy. First, the ROC decided to stop playing the zero-sum game—although Peking still holds to it—and adopted a policy in effect saying that if any nation established relations with both Taipei and Peking, Taipei would not break relations. Second, the government addressed the identity issue head-on.
Of course, no nation wants to use anything but its official name in international forums. But this is where pragmatism comes in. Rigid adherence to set names and titles was obstructing the path to building substantive links with other nations and obtaining membership in key international organizations. It was therefore time to introduce more flexibility: use names that work. If names can change, they can also eventually be rectified. Instead of defending names, the policy shifted to an aggressive focus on the ROC's strengths. The government decided to take advantage of its growing international status as a trading power.
Jui-hsiung Ouyang (歐陽瑞雄), spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) summarizes the new attitude in this way: "Pragmatic diplomacy simply means that after evaluating our abilities and limitations, we do what we can. We don't want to be constrained by the Peking regime. We must be flexible in promoting our foreign relations."
At first the changes were somewhat tentative, as the government gradually refined the new policy. For example, officials indicated in public speeches that Taipei could accept peaceful coexistence with Peking in the international community. Others raised the possibility of more flexibility over the use of "Republic of China" in international forums. Under the new pragmatic policy, the use of other designations was approved, names that not only maintained the country's dignity, but also gave it more clout in the international arena.
Without formal diplomatic recognition, the ROC could not set up embassies under its official name. In the interests of facilitating trade and building foreign relations, the government had to come up with a creative solution to the problem. Representative, trade, and cultural offices were established around the world under a wide variety of names such as the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in Japan, the Taipei Representative Office in the U.K., and the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in Canada. Today, there are 88 of these offices in 58 nations bolstering the ROC's 29 embassies and 5 consulates in 29 countries or states. These offices greatly facilitate two-way business travel and tourism.
The ROC also accepted an arrangement with the International Olympic Committee to change its name to "Chinese Taipei," which allowed its athletes to compete in 1989 games. "The government shouldn't spend so much time on the 'name issue,''' businessman Daniel Chieh says. "It doesn't matter if it's 'Chinese Taipei,' 'Taipei China,' or whatever. Getting approval to enter international organizations is more important."
At present, the government has put especially high priority on rejoining the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Since a worldwide trend toward forming regional economic zones is developing, the ROC's membership in GATT can provide a powerful channel for economic communication and cooperation with other nations. It can also ensure access to larger markets-more than 100 nations are members of GATT. But the name issue has been a stumbling block.
Last September, the government applied under the name "Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu." The ROC has been granted observer status under that designation in the organization, and GATT will establish a working party to review the ROC's application for being a regular member. In terms of politics, GATT membership would be a graphic indication of just how far the ROC has come economically. Accession should also open the door to membership in other international organizations.
Entry into the international arena provides many opportunities, but also entails responsibilities. In fact, the ROC is now able to build on a history of providing economic and technical support to other countries. For instance, since the early 1960s, the ROC Committee of International Technical Cooperation has sent agricultural, fishery, handicraft, and medical service missions to many developing countries. Currently, 433 Chinese experts are at work in 33 nations, mostly in Africa, Latin America, and Asia.
S.L.Chang - "I always push to increase MOFA's budget, but the cabinet has the last word."
Offering direct economic assistance is another form of sharing the burden of international responsibility. For example, after the ROC established diplomatic relations with Niger in June 1992, the government promised to lend US$50 million to the African nation. But the arrangement raised some concern that the government might be "buying" its foreign relations success. MOFA spokesman Jui-hsiung Ouyang says that this is actually impossible. "With our limited budget, the foreign ministry is not able to 'buy diplomacy.' It is a misunderstanding. Some people think that our economic accomplishments give us the power to buy anything we want."
The economic-aid dimension does have an important role in diplomacy, according to Lin Bih-jaw (林碧炤), director of the Institute of International Relations. "For instance, the ROC didn't have close relations with Latin America either culturally or historically," he says. "You therefore have to think of some way to build a bridge, and economic aid is something badly needed by some countries." Lin suggests that economic aid should be a two-way street, an approach that helps other countries help themselves. "We can offer them grants, and they can buy our industrial products or employ our technical teams," Lin says.
A similar view is held by David S. Chou (周煦), chairman of the Institute of Diplomacy, National Chengchi University. He says: "It is better for economic aid to be used in helping third-world countries promote their own economic development. We don't want to give other nations the wrong image. Relations between countries should be established on a long-term and healthy foundation."
To facilitate long-term international relationships through economic assistance, in March 1988, the ROC established a NT$30 billion (US$1.1 billion) International Economic Cooperation and Development Fund. The fund is in charge of disbursing overseas economic aid. Its key members include the secretary-general of the Executive Yuan, the ministers of Economic Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Finance, and Transportation and Communications, the Chairman of the Council for Economic Planning and Development, and the Governor of the Central Bank of China. They meet every two or three months. At a meeting in October 1992, for example, they decided to extend economic aid to Vietnam, Belorussia, and South Africa, offering each a loan of US$8 million to US$15 million.
Despite the ROC's rejection of zero-sum diplomacy and the generous foreign aid it supplies, diplomatic relations have remained elusive. The realities of international politics dim the prospects for the re-establishment of diplomatic ties with many countries in the near future. Most nations have recognized Peking, and it is unlikely that they will renew relations with Taipei. Moreover, Peking uses all means at its disposal to keep Taipei from participating in international political and economic organizations.
But the policy of pragmatic diplomacy has given the Republic of China the flexibility to take advantage of changes in the world's political and economic climate to enhance its situation. With the collapse of communism in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, a new world order is emerging based more on economic considerations than on ideology. As a result, the strategic importance of communist China has diminished, as has its power to dictate policy to other countries. The Tienanmen Incident has also indelibly tarnished the Peking regime's image abroad. According to Jainting Kung (龔政定), director of European Affairs, MOFA, "Many nations are impressed with the ROC's rapid political liberalization and economic internationalization. And after the Tienanmen Incident on June 4, 1989, European nations have become more interested in Taiwan."
The recent worldwide economic slump has also helped boost the ROC's status. Asia has the highest economic growth rates in the world today. Active economies and healthy markets are forcing Western nations to reconsider the region's importance. Not surprisingly, the majority of foreign visitors to Taiwan come for economic and trade reasons. The Six-Year National Development Plan with a budget of NT$8.2 trillion (US$303 billion) is a major attraction. An ROC cabinet minister once commented that the large infrastructure projects in the six-year plan can be used as chips when developing foreign relations.
S. L. Chang (張世良), legislator and member of the Committee of Foreign Relations in the Legislative Yuan says: "I don't think it's a good idea to use the six-year plan as a bargaining chip. It's inappropriate to use domestic projects for diplomatic leverage in dealing with foreign countries." But MOFA's Jui-hsiung Ouyang says: "Since most of the projects will be implemented under open bidding, quality and price will be the major concerns when choosing companies, domestic or foreign. But if the projects can be coordinated with the foreign policy, why not?"
The ROC government is actively cultivating this new interest, and diplomatic exchanges have increased accordingly. Foreign officials have been accepting invitations from the ROC in record numbers. Until the policy of pragmatic diplomacy was adopted, it was hard to attract foreign dignitaries. After diplomatic ties between the U.S. and the ROC were suspended in 1979, cabinet-level U.S. government officials stopped visiting Taiwan. During the 1980s, European countries followed in the steps of the United States, and their high-ranking officials also stopped coming. But times have changed dramatically. High-ranking government officials now arrive in Taipei on a weekly basis; in the last two years alone, nearly thirty cabinet-level officials have visited the ROC.
Budget limitations remain one of the biggest obstacles to developing international relations. The 1993 budget was NT$11.9 billion, or 1.7 percent of the total national budget. Legislator S. L. Chang says: "I always push to increase MOFA's budget, but the cabinet has the last word. The six-year plan will require a tremendous amount of money. Consequently, there just isn't much left for MOFA."
Du Ling, director of African Affairs Department, MOFA, says ROC offices abroad often have to operate on a shoestring.
Since the beginning of 1990, the ROC has established thirty-one new offices around the world, requiring about ninety new staff members. The question now is how to pay for that success. Overseas offices are already operating on a shoestring. Du Ling (杜稜), director of African Affairs, foreign ministry says: "Our embassies in Africa usually have just has one ambassador, one secretary, and a staff of two. Whereas mainland China's embassies usually have staffs of more than one hundred."
In the face of these disadvantages, the 1,200 staff members of the foreign ministry never relax their efforts in promoting the ROC's foreign relations. Jui-hsiung Auyang says: "We will take full advantage of our economic power to play an active role in the international community. Under the pressure of the Communist China, the number of countries that maintain official ties with the ROC may not increase in the near future. But we will continue working to enhance our relations with other nations. Ultimately, we hope to re-enter the United Nations."
Business is behind the government's efforts. Kega Yao (姚啟甲), managing director of Sun Chain Trading Co. is one businessman who fully supports the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. "Successful foreign relations will smooth the way for international trade," he says. "Our government should move with all speed to develop diplomatic ties. At this stage, the accomplishments might be small, but one small step today will mean big breakthroughs tomorrow."